Intelligence
AEV-2026-0013

AshAi identity filter let a caller retarget an update or destroy tool (CVE-2026-82564)

AshAi's identity_filter built an update or destroy tool's target filter directly from a raw tool argument, so a nested comparison value in place of a scalar identifier retargeted the operation at a different record. Disclosed by the ash-project maintainers, patched in AshAi 1.0.0 the same day, with no evidence of exploitation before the fix.

AESS 8.0 highConfirmedStatus: resolvedEvent: 30 August 2026Execution Authority

Affected

Organisation
ash-project (AshAi)
Product
AshAi
Component
identity_filter in AshAi.Tool.Execution, the update and destroy tool target resolution path
Versions
AshAi 0.6.0 and later, before 1.0.0
Configurations
An identity configured update or destroy tool reachable by a caller, demonstrated over AshAi's MCP router

Execution authority facts

Fields the evidence does not establish are shown as unknown rather than guessed.

Intended task
A caller invokes an identity configured update or destroy tool naming its own record by a scalar identity value
Agent
A tool calling client, demonstrated as an ordinary MCP JSON RPC tools call request
Delegating actor
The application operator who exposed the identity configured tool
Action
Updated a record other than the one the caller's identity argument named
Target resource
Any record of the exposed resource reachable through the identity attribute's filter, not only the one the caller identified
Environment
An Ash application exposing the tool, demonstrated through AshAi.Mcp.Router in the maintainers' own reproduction
Credentials used
unknown
Privileges available
Whatever the identity configured tool was itself authorized to update or destroy, applied to a broader or different record than intended
Authority presented
Authority to update or destroy the one record its own identity argument names
Authority required
Authority over the specific record or records the operation actually resolves against
Applicable policy
The tool's identity configuration, naming the attribute meant to address the target record
Approval mechanism
none
Required approver
unknown
Independent approval
no
Action binding
The identity argument was meant to bind the operation to one record; a nested comparison value let the same argument bind it to a different record instead
Sequence context
unknown

Impact

Consequence
Unauthorized update of a record other than the one identified, with the same mechanism extending to destroy and, combined with a bulk operation, to any row of the table
Reach
organisational
Reversibility
unknown
Detectability
silent
Propagation
potential
Recovery
unknown, no recovery or reversal mechanism described beyond the code fix itself

Evidence

Primary sources

Supporting sources

Reproduction status
Demonstrated by the maintainers as a reproducible proof of concept over AshAi's MCP router; not independently executed by Moona Intelligence against a running deployment
Evidence state
Confirmed

Known unknowns

  • Whether this was exploited against a real deployment before the patch, beyond the maintainers' own proof of concept.
  • What share of AshAi deployments before 1.0.0 exposed an identity configured update or destroy tool to an untrusted caller.

Limitations

  • Moona Intelligence verified the vulnerable and patched source directly but did not execute the proof of concept against a running AshAi application.

Claim provenance